We articulate and test an explanation for the remarkable change and continuity in contemporary tax policy in capitalist democracies. We argue that internationalization, domestic eco- T he globalization theory of taxation suggests that the ability of mo bile asset holders to exit national jurisdictions forces policy makers to compete for investment (Tanzi 1995) . In the strongest versions of the theory, taxes on capital and other mobile asset holders such as professionals are progressively reduced to the "lowest common denominator." Tax burdens on relatively immobile factors and activities (i.e., most labor and consumption) are increased (Christiansen, Hagen, and Sandmo 1994 ). Yet, the empirical record of tax policy change does not fit the globalization thesis; although statutory tax rates, brackets, and investment incentives have been reduced almost everywhere, we find a remarkable stability in the levels and distribution of tax burdens.
T he globalization theory of taxation suggests that the ability of mo bile asset holders to exit national jurisdictions forces policy makers to compete for investment (Tanzi 1995) . In the strongest versions of the theory, taxes on capital and other mobile asset holders such as professionals are progressively reduced to the "lowest common denominator." Tax burdens on relatively immobile factors and activities (i.e., most labor and consumption) are increased (Christiansen, Hagen, and Sandmo 1994 ). Yet, the empirical record of tax policy change does not fit the globalization thesis; although statutory tax rates, brackets, and investment incentives have been reduced almost everywhere, we find a remarkable stability in the levels and distribution of tax burdens.
Here, we argue that the tax impacts of internationalization are important, but in more complex ways than globalization theory suggests. Specifically, through analysis of data from fourteen developed democracies for 1981 to 1995, we show that rises in capital mobility and trade have systematically preceded cuts in statutory tax rates. We also demonstrate, however, that three factors-internationalization, domestic economic change, and budgetary forces-simultaneously constrain changes in tax burdens and, together, help explain the complexity of tax policy outcomes.
Taxation in Developed Capitalist Democracies
After World War II, tax policy became a central instrument for achieving social and economic policy goals. Indeed, the regime of high marginal tax rates-combined with generous tax incentives for investment and controls regulating capital export-was a centerpiece of the postwar compromise between capital and labor in all industrialized democracies and contributed to the joint pursuit of equity and growth in the Keynesian welfare state (Martin 1991; Steinmo 1993; Swank 1992) . From the early 1980s, national policy makers significantly altered the character of tax policies. The transition in tax policy constituted a shift in policy paradigm: the relative weight accorded the goals of equity and growth, the use of tax policy instruments (e.g., the extent of investment incentives), and the settings of the instruments (e.g., the level of rates) were all notably changed by post-1970s tax reforms. 1 Table 1 summarizes many of these tax policy changes for corporate and capital taxation. Policy makers cut statutory corporate tax rates on average from 45 to 35 percent between 1981 and 1995. They also eliminated a broad array of investment credits, exemptions, and grants that had substantially lowered effective corporate tax rates on reinvested profits (Swank 1998; Steinmo 1986; OCED 1993) . For instance, all governments eliminated general investment tax credits by the early 1990s. 2 Reflecting the combined effects of declines in marginal tax rates, base-broadening, and other forces (see below), effective average tax rates on capital income have been surprisingly stable between the early 1980s and mid1990s: the effective capital tax rate in the typical developed democracy has decreased only slightly from 38 to 36 percent between 1981 and 1995. The same pattern holds if we estimate changes in taxes on the most mobile Tax on Capital 3   Nation  1981  1995  1981  1992  1981  1995   Australia  46  33  18  0  47  46  Austria  na  na  na  na  23  22  Belgium  48  39  5  0  39  39  Canada  48  39  7  0  39  50  Denmark  40  34  0  0  na  na  Finland  na  na  na  na  34  34  France  50  33  10  0  28  25  Germany  56  47  0  0  33  25  Ireland  45  40  0  0  na  na  Italy  36  53  0  0  22  33  Japan  42  38  0  0  37  44  Netherlands  48  35  12  0  32  28  New Zealand  42  33  0  0  na  na  Norway  51  28  0  0  44  33  Sweden  58  38  10  0  53  42  Switzerland  10  10  0  0  na  na  United Kingdom  52  33  0  0  63  46  United States  46  35  10  0  45  43   Mean  45  35  5  0  38  36 forms of capital income-corporate and financial income; effective average tax rates have declined minimally from 26 to 24 percent of income during the 1981 to 1995 period. 3 Personal income taxation followed a similar pattern: between 1975 and 1995, policy makers significantly cut the top marginal tax rates, reduced the number of tax brackets and indexed them to inflation, and broadened tax bases through the elimination of a variety of allowances, exemptions, and credits (e.g., Boskin and McClure 1990; Pechman 1988; OECD 1993) . Reflecting the interaction among declining statutory rates, base-broadening, and rises in social insurance taxes (see below), the trend in actual personal income tax burdens in the 1980s and 1990s is stable. For instance, even relatively affluent citizens experienced largely constant tax burdens: the effective average personal tax rate on earners at 200 percent of the average production worker's salary increased slightly from 31 to 33 percent of income between 1978 and 1992 (OECD, 1995 . 4 Table 2 displays the post-1970s changes in the effective average tax rates on labor and consumption as well as taxation as a share of gross domestic product. Again, effective average tax rates measure the actual absolute and relative burdens on factors and activities. The tax burden on labor has risen modestly between 1981 and 1995. In fact, the majority of nations have experienced an increase in the effective tax rate that is close to the mean growth of four percent of wages and salaries. It is necessary, however, to disaggregate the labor tax burden to get a complete picture of policy change: personal income taxes rose negligi- Tax-Consumption 2  Percent of GDP   Nation  1981  1995  1981  1995  1981  1995   Australia  21  22  9  8  30  31  Austria  45  48  na  na  44  42  Belgium  42  48  17  17  45  46  Canada  25  32  14  13  35  37  Denmark  na  na  na  na  45  51  Finland  36  48  25  26  38  46  France  43  49  22  21  42  44  Germany  39  44  16  16  38  39  Ireland  na  na  na  na  33  34  Italy  34  47  12  16  31  41  Japan  24  28  5  6  26  29  Netherlands  50  51  17  18  44  44  New Zealand  na  na  na  na  34  38  Norway  40  40  37  38  49  46  Sweden  52  52  21  23  50  50  Switzerland  na  na  na  na  31  34  United Kingdom  29  25  15  17  36  36  United States  29  30  6  6  29  28   Mean  36  40  17  17  38  40 bly from 17.3 to 17.7 percent of income while social insurance taxes rose on average from 18.5 to 23.8 percent of income between 1978 and 1995. Nearly all nations have maintained taxes on consumption within a range of 1 to 2 percent of the effective tax rate in the early 1980s. With regard to tax shares of GDP, fifteen of the eighteen focal democracies experienced a change in tax revenues of three percent of GDP or less. During the 1980s and 1990s, the advanced democracies experienced substantial change in statutory rates and the uses of taxation. Yet, with only a few exceptions, actual tax burdens on capital, labor, and consumption remained remarkably stable. How can we account for the changes in the content of tax policy and the remarkable stability of tax burdens?
International Capital Mobility and Taxation: Globalization Theory
Classic political economists such as Adam Smith (1976 Smith ( [1776 ) as well as modern scholars such as Bates and Lien (1985) and Lee and McKenzie (1989) have argued that increasingly mobile capital poses substantial problems for governments that seek to tax mobile assets and pursue policies adverse to the economic interests and ideological orientations of (mobile) business. 5 With globalization, increasingly mobile asset holders seek the highest rate of return in international markets. Governments of all ideological complexions not only have to consider the domestic environment of business investment decisions, but in a world of high-capital mobility, they also have to consider international investment climates and policy assessments of international market actors and mobile enterprises. 6 Thus, the interaction of governments and transnationally mobile capital becomes a prisoner's dilemma: in the face of difficulties in achieving international policy cooperation, governments each face incentives to compete for investment by reducing tax burdens to a "lowest common denominator." Moreover, in models of taxation in open economies with fully mobile capital, the optimal rate of tax on income from capital (from an economic efficiency standpoint) is thought to be zero; shortfalls of revenue are offset by shifting taxes to less mobile factors such as labor and land (e.g., Razin and Sadka 1991; Gordon and Mackie-Mason 1995) . In addition, Tanzi (1995 ), Genshel (1999 and others have argued that it is not only increased asset mobility itself, but transfer pricing and other new tax avoidance strategies that have pressured tax policy makers: internationalization may lead to reduced revenue collections on transnationally fluid assets and, in turn, an impetus for tax reforms. In sum, globalization theory first predicts that as international capital and labor mobility increase, there should be notable declines in effective tax rates on capital income, corporate profits, and high income earners. Second, it predicts that there should be shifts toward taxation of relatively immobile factors or, where factor mobility is extensive, declines in taxation across most revenue categories (e.g., Lee and McKenzie 1989). 7 The evidence. Empirical studies of the relationship between internationalization and national tax policy have produced mixed results (see Schulze and Ursprung 1999) . On the one hand, Rodrik (1997) finds increasing trade openness and, at high levels of trade openness, capital control liberalization are associated with declines in effective tax rates on capital; increasing trade openness is associated with increases in taxes on labor. However, the weight of empirical findings does not support the globalization thesis. Wallerstein and Przeworski (1995) have shown that as long as the cost of investment is fully deductible (i.e., through depreciation), governments can collect substantial revenues from a stable tax on uninvested profits even when capital is fully mobile; capital investment by business will only decline between the announcement and implementation of a tax increase on profits. Garrett (1996 Garrett ( , 1998a Garrett ( , 1998b , Garrett and Mitchell (2001) , Quinn (1997) , and Swank (1998 Swank ( , 2002 chapter 7) have all reported that capital mobility is either unrelated or positively related to various measures of aggregate tax burdens in the contemporary democracies. Finally, Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) find that 1986 to 1990 changes in corporate and personal tax rates are, at best, only indirectly related to liberalization of capital markets. 5 Annual average capital flows-foreign direct, portfolio, and bank investment-grew on average from roughly seven to 50 percent of GDP between the periods, 1965-73 and 1991-95 (see Table 1 for country sample and the appendix for data sources.) Today, few formal impediments to financial flows exist in the large majority of capitalist democracies. 6 Although the relationship between taxation and international investment is complex, evidence exists to suggest that taxation is one of a set of determinants of international investment patterns (e.g., Giovannini et al. 1993; IMF 1991; OECD 1991) . Results from the quantitative research are supported by extensive interviews with over fifty business managers and policy makers from 1992 to 1997 (Steinmo 2001) . 7 The expected effect of trade openness on taxation is uncertain. As Garrett (1998b) has pointed out, one common view is that trade openness forces policy makers to reduce taxes to promote the competitiveness of goods in the exposed sector of the economy and general economic efficiency. On the other hand, some scholars believe that trade openness promotes a large public economy and associated tax burdens. In this view, trade openness leads policy makers to compensate losers of international competition, insure citizens against risks inherent in international markers, and provide public goods that promote competitiveness.
Internationalization and Taxation: An Alternative Theoretical View
Internationalization should play a significant yet circumscribed role in cuts in statutory rates and tax-based investment incentives. On the one hand, economic pressures on governments from international capital mobility militate in favor of the reduction of tax rates on mobile asset holders. On the other hand, policy makers must maintain revenues in the context of rising needs, the downward stickiness of public expenditure, and an increasingly debt-adverse environment (see below for elaboration). A solution to this dilemma is simultaneously to cut statutory tax rates and reduce or eliminate "tax expenditures." As Slemrod (1990) has pointed out, a mix of low statutory tax rates and few investment reliefs makes sense for many nations in the context of internationalized markets. Low rates retain taxable income that would otherwise be shifted through transferpricing to low tax nations. Cuts in tax reliefs on reinvested profits also bolster revenues: governments can maintain foreign investment and collect taxes from it if the investment comes from nations that provide credits for foreign taxes paid and have significant taxes on reinvested profits. Moreover, statutory marginal tax rates serve as especially important cues to holders of mobile assets (e.g., Ganghof 2000) .
In addition, adverse economic conditions from the 1970s to 1990s may have significantly advanced the perception that the old regime of taxation is inefficient. The 1970s economic downturn initially accelerated the use of tax-based investment incentives (e.g., Martin 1991) . From the early 1980s, however, governments increasingly associated tax-based reliefs with the inefficient allocation of investment as well as tax avoidance and lost tax revenues (Swank, 1998) . Generally, the shift to a structure of lower nominal tax rates and fewer taxed-based investment incentives appears to follow the post-1970 slide in economic performance. In sum, we expect internationalization and a secular decline in domestic economic performance to be associated with the shift in the content of tax policy.
Although the content of tax policy has changed, policy makers in developed democracies have faced a complex set of constraints on altering actual tax burdens. Internationalization creates pressures for reductions in the effective tax rate on capital income. The decline in domestic economic performance also calls forth capital tax cuts to promote profitability, investment, and, in turn, job creation. However, shifting the tax burden to labor is difficult. First, capital mobility sensitizes policy makers to the nonwage costs that internationally mobile enterprises face and thus creates pressures for reductions in taxes on labor. Second, rises in long-term unemployment also encourage reductions in labor taxation in order to mitigate negative "tax wedge" effects on employment generation. 8 In fact, the secular rise in structural unemployment increasingly became the focus of policy maker attention in the 1980s and 1990s (see the OECD Jobs Study; OECD 1994). Rises in public sector debt, however, limit tax policy change and call forth tax increases. Although significant reductions in public expenditure would allow cuts in capital and labor taxes, increased demands for social protection fuel public spending and raise the specter of new taxes; the political limits on welfare state retrenchment also constrain the depth of spending cuts. Finally, as recent experiences suggest (e.g., Japan), expectations of adverse effects on economic growth and employment as well as political resistence make it difficult to shift the tax burden toward domestic consumption.
We hypothesize that, all else constant, internationalization exerts downward pressures on both capital and labor taxation. We also expect that rises in structural unemployment exert downward pressure on capital taxes and engender significant cuts in labor taxation. The need simultaneously to address international and domestic pressures on both capital and labor taxation limits the magnitude of tax policy change in any one area. Moreover, we hypothesize that both accumulated public sector debt and demands for public spending increase tax burdens. In sum, while concerns about efficiency and revenues have led policy makers to shift priorities, rates, and the relative use of tax-based policy instruments, the conflicting pressures created by contemporary international and domestic forces leave little room to alter relative or absolute tax burdens.
Evaluating Conventional and Alternative Theories
To assess core hypotheses, we develop empirical models of tax policy and estimate these with 1981 to 1995 data from fourteen developed capitalist democracies. We focus on the post-1980 period because data for several key variables (e.g., long-term unemployment) do not extend back much before 1980 and the substantive focus of our study concerns changes that occurred primarily after 8 Tax wedge effects on employment occur where the net wage (the wage after income and social security taxes) employers can offer is too low relative to the net wage potential employees are willing to accept to generate appreciable job growth. Consumption taxes may also influence the size of the tax wedge.
1980; restrictions on data availability also limit analysis to a sample of developed democracies. 9 We focus on changes in statutory marginal corporate tax rates as well as effective average tax rates on capital, labor, and consumption. 10 We construct measures of effective tax rates using the methodology developed by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) and described in Tables 1 and 2 above.
We assess the effects of central features of internationalization, domestic economic change, and budgetary pressures. With regard to internationalization, we emphasize tests of the effects of general levels of international capital mobility on taxation. We utilize an index of the liberalization of capital controls developed by Quinn (1997) to measure capital mobility. 11 Our measure of liberalization is a 0.0-4.0 scale of the removal of capital controls where 4.0 indicates the absence of controls. We also examine the effects of trade openness measured as exports and imports as percentages of GDP. We explore the tax policy consequences of structural unemployment-a central feature of post-1970 deterioration of economic performance-in all models. Structural unemployment is measured as the percentage of the civilian labor force unemployed for one year or more. 12 We also control for the impacts of profits, investment, and growth rates in our models of corporate tax rates and capital taxation. For models of labor and consumption, we replace profits and investment with inflation and unemployment rates. Profits and investment are both operationalized as annual percent changes in real quantities; growth, inflation, and unemployment rates are measured as the percentage change in real per capita GDP, the percentage change in the consumer price index, and the percent of the civilian labor force unemployed, respectively.
We highlight tests of public sector debt (gross public debt as a percent of GDP) and the public spending effects of the elderly population (percent of the population 65 and older). Although business cycle variables capture the effects of need on budgets, the aged population is an especially important source of demands for public spending. Parties seek different amounts of revenue commensurate with their preferred level of welfare and public goods provision. Therefore, we estimate tax effects of government control by Left and Christian Democratic parties in each model. We operationalize party control of government as the percentage of cabinet portfolios held by a type of party. In addition, we include lagged levels of tax variables, which provide an indicator of inertia in the tax policymaking process and are incorporated for technical reasons (see below). Unless indicated, exogenous variables are all lagged one year.
Estimation
We estimate tax models with pooled time-series crosssections of 1981-1995 annualized data for thirteen nations. This design presents a variety of estimation problems, including serially correlated errors, contemporaneously correlated errors, and cross-sectionally heteroskedastic errors. We follow Beck and Katz (1996) and estimate the following model with ordinary least squares (OLS):
where y i,t represent values of taxation in country i and time t; x is vector of independent variables measured at i, t; ␣ is a constant and and ␤ are parameters that link lagged values of y and exogenous variables in x to y; and ⑀ is an error term. As Beck and Katz argue, inclusion of a lagged dependent variable explicitly models temporal dynamics and typically produces serially uncorrelated errors (confirmed here for all models by Lagrange multiplier tests). We also follow Beck and Katz and derive standard errors from the OLS variance-covariance matrix panel-corrected for contemporaneous correlation and cross-sectionally heteroskedastic errors (Beck and Katz 1996, Equation 9 ).
Finally, we explore two additional methodological issues. First, we address the possibility that coefficients will vary considerably in direction and significance across countries by estimating specific effects for focal variables within (and outside of) individual nations; we describe 9 We significantly extend 1970 to 1993 models of taxation developed in Swank (2002, chapter 7) . Data for effective tax rates are missing for a number of countries thus limiting analysis to thirteen or fourteen nations, depending on the tax variable. However, our sample-Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark (for the corporate rate model), Finland (excluded for corporate tax rate model), France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States-represents the developed democracies well. 10 Statutory marginal rates are instruments subject to direct manipulation but do not necessarily tell us much about actual tax burdens; effective average tax rates on factor income measure actual tax burdens. To simplify analysis, and because of the absence of adequate annual measures, we exclude direct analysis of marginal personal income tax rates and tax-based investment incentives. 11 The substitution of measures constructed with data on actual capital flows generally confirms our reported results. It is important to note, however, that flow measures based on foreign direct investment duplicate our reported findings; measures constructed with financial flows (portfolio and bank investment) typically produce less consistently significant results. and report these highly stable, country coefficient estimates in Appendix Table 1 . 13 Second, we assess the robustness of our estimates in the presence of country and year dummy variables. Although adding time and unit fixed effects to our model may create inconsistency in the estimates and severely increase multicollinearity, exclusion of significant time and unit effects might create bias in our estimates. 14 Estimates from these fixed effects models-reported in Appendix Table 2 -closely reflect those reported in Table 3 . Table 3 presents the tests of the effects of international, domestic economic, and budgetary forces on statutory corporate tax rates and on the effective average tax rates on capital, labor, and consumption. We proceed by discussing the findings for each tax variable. Internationalization is indeed related to the shift in the content of tax policy: liberalization of capital controls and trade openness are negatively associated with statutory corporate tax rates, and the substantive magnitude of the effect of capital mobility is large. The short-term impact of a one unit change in liberalization is -.0164. Given that statutory corporate rates are expressed as proportions, this effect amounts roughly to a one-and-a-half percentage point cut in corporate rates. The long-term effect of a unit change in a causal variable in a model that includes a lagged dependent variable is given by the equation, ␤ = ␤′/(1 -) where ␤′ is the estimated coefficient for the causal variable and . is the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable. Thus, the long-term effect of a unit change in liberalization of capital controls is -.0164/ (1 -.8747), or -.1309. The average 1981-1995 increase in liberalization is, however, 0.8 on our index. Thus, for the typical country, international liberalization is associated in the long term with a ten-point cut in statutory corporate rates (-.1309 × 0.8).
Empirical Findings
That liberalization of capital controls is negatively related to statutory corporate rates merits further comment. Liberalization is a widely used measure of capital openness and taps the formal-legal potential for capital flows; it is, however, also a measure of policy choice. Did liberalization occur concomitantly with rate cuts and associated market-oriented reforms, or did it play a central role in causing subsequent tax policy change?
To explore this question, we draw upon supplementary statistical analysis and our extensive interviews with policy makers. First, using the model of column one of Table 3 , we estimated the tax rate effects of liberalization at lags of 0 through 3 years. Liberalization of capital controls is not contemporaneously associated with tax policy change (␤′ = -.0001, t = -.70); policy makers did not simultaneously remove capital controls and engineer statutory rate cuts and related tax policy changes. Liberalization of capital controls is, however, significantly related to a shift in tax policy after a time lag: the shortterm statutory tax rate effect of liberalization at t -1 (as reported in Table 3 ) is -.0164 (t = -4.32), at t -2 is -.0158 (t = -4.25), and at t -3 is -.0092 (t = -2.64).
From the late 1970s through the early 1990s, policy makers throughout industrialized nations eliminated international capital controls. Deregulation was typically supported by shifts to hard currency policy and an antiinflationary macroeconomic stance. This liberalization contributed significantly to the expansion of transnational capital flows. For instance, the (long-term) effect of a one unit increase in liberalization (t-1) on FDI is equivalent to 1.32 percentage points of GDP. 15 In the wake of rises in the formal-legal potential for capital mobility, general integration of domestic and international markets, and transnational capital flows, we expect for reasons articulated in our theory that policy makers felt increasing pressure to make taxation more market-oriented. Indeed, the view that internationalization required a change in tax policy regime-cuts in statutory business tax rates and the elimination of market distortions in tax policy-consistently emerged from our 1990s interviews with tax policy makers across the developed democracies. 16 In addition, in the wake of liberalization and rises in capital flows, center-right politicians, business, and nal to mobile enterprises-and otherwise make policy more efficiency-oriented (Interview [Swank] , Ministry of Economics, Bonn, December 1996). Such views were echoed by tax policy makers in governments throughout the OECD (for a synopsis of roughly fifty interviews across several years and nations, see Steinmo 2001 ).
neoliberal economists intensified their calls for marketoriented reforms in social welfare and tax policies, commonly invoking the argument that competitiveness and business location now made efficiency-oriented reforms more imperative than ever (see Swank 2002 , chapters 3-6, for extensive case study evidence). Together, these political economic forces contributed to statutory corporate rate cuts. 17 In addition to internationalization, past levels of tax rates and Christian Democratic governments are significantly related to corporate tax rates. Other factors are, however, insignificant. The absence of an effect of domestic economic change is surprising. Our expectation was that cuts in marginal rates with base-broadening reductions in investment incentives would be prompted by both internationalization and the post-1970 decline of domestic economic performance. However, the rise of structural unemployment, itself, does not appear to play much of a role in explaining reductions in statutory corporate rates in the model of Table 3 . 18 The second column of Table 3 reports results for models of the effective average tax rate on capital. There is no support for the notion that liberalization of capital controls systematically led to reductions in the effective tax rate on capital; the coefficient for liberalization is insignificant. 19 These results are consistent with the argument that while internationalization has influenced the shift in the content of tax policy, the combined effect of statutory rate cuts and base-broadening reductions in investment incentives has left the effective tax burden on capital largely unchanged. The findings are also consistent with the view that the absence of relationship between capital mobility and effective capital tax rates (or even a small positive relationship) may be the result of a systematic decline in the capital tax base through transfer pricing by corporations, international portfolio diversification or capital flight by financial capital, and related dynamics (e.g., Genshel 1999; Tanzi 1995). We find no evidence to support this view in our analysis of the impact of the liberalization of capital controls and trade openness on total or mobile capital income.
The impacts of domestic economic and budgetary pressures are important. Rises in structural unemployment are systematically associated with reductions in capital tax burdens. The long-term effect of structural unemployment is relatively large: an increase equal to 1 percent of the work force is associated with a 5 percentage point drop in the effective tax rate on capital (-.345/[1 -.9316] ). 20 In addition, past tax rates and increases in public sector debt (but not current needs for government spending) are positively associated with capital taxes. For instance, an increase in public debt of 10 percent of GDP is associated with a rise of 3.72 in the effective tax rate on capital. With regard to other forces, Left governments are associated with slightly higher capital tax rates while declines in economic growth, investment, and profits are associated with reductions in effective tax rates on capital. Together, the findings offer some support for our view that while internationalization contributed to the shift in the content of tax policy, it has not resulted in reductions in actual tax burdens on capital. Moreover, domestic economic and budgetary forces exert strong pressures on tax policy makers.
We extend our analysis to the effective average tax rates on labor income and consumption in the last two columns of Table 3 . In these models, we omit profits and investment and add controls for inflation and unemployment rates. Otherwise, specification and estimation are identical to procedures for prior models. For the sake of parsimony, we present the main findings succinctly. Liberalization of capital controls is negatively associated with effective tax rates on labor; there is no relationship between liberalization and consumption tax rates. Trade openness is unrelated to labor taxation but has a small positive association with consumption taxation. This finding is consistent with theory that argues trade openness creates needs for domestic compensation and associated taxes and, in turn, sensitizes policy makers to the need to defray some of the costs of that compensation to consumption from profits.
The impacts of domestic economic and budgetary pressures on labor taxation are nearly identical to those for capital taxation. Rises in structural unemployment lead to reductions in the tax burden on labor income. It is unlikely that the negative effect of structural unemployment is a manifestation of a fall in capital income due to economic downturn. Controls for general economic growth, profits, and investment will largely capture these business cycle effects. 17 We certainly do not deny that the general ascent of neoliberal orthodoxy and parties broadly undergirded both liberalization of financial controls and domestic market-oriented reforms. Our argument is, however, that liberalization (and internationalization more broadly) is clearly linked in a causal chain to shifts in tax policy. 18 Structural unemployment is significantly related to marginal corporate rates in the fixed effects model of Appendix Table 2 . Given the problems with this estimator, we do wish to privilege this finding. For now, we regard the effect of economic decline on statutory rates as indeterminate. 19 We also estimated the effects of internationalization on the effective tax rate on mobile capital (financial income and corporate taxes only). The results are virtually identical to those reported in Table 3 . In addition, we substituted lagged levels of total foreign direct investment and financial flows for liberalization; we found that these measures of capital mobility are unrelated to capital taxation.
pansions of public sector debt create upward pressures on labor taxes. However, once debt and other forces are accounted, current needs for government spending do not increase labor taxation. With regard to consumption, other than the effects of past tax levels and needs, forces highlighted in our models do not seem to matter for highly stable tax burdens on consumption.
Overall, findings for effective tax rates on labor income and consumption are consistent with our expectations. Internationalization has not resulted in a shift of the tax burden to labor and consumption as conventional globalization theory predicts. To the contrary, evidence suggests that international capital mobility has sensitized policy makers to potential economic costs of high labor taxes. In addition, domestic economic and budgetary forces play significant roles in tax policy change, especially in the case of labor taxation.
Conclusions: The New Political Economy of Taxation
From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, governments across the developed democracies have systematically lowered statutory rates on corporate and personal income and eliminated many allowances, exemptions, credits, and reliefs. Concerns about efficiency and revenues have seemingly eclipsed the goal of redistribution through steeply progressive rates. However, this paradigm shift in tax policy has occurred with remarkable stability in levels and the distribution of tax burdens. Our analysis has provided evidence on the distinct sources of the changes in the content of tax policy and the continuity in levels and burdens.
Internationalization has mattered but in much more complex ways that globalization theory suggests. Reforms in the content of tax policy systematically follow rises in international capital mobility and trade openness; increases in capital mobility are also associated with reductions in the tax components of labor costs. At the same time, structural unemployment leads to employment-oriented cuts in effective tax rates on both capital and labor. Public sector debt constrains the scope of tax reduction and even engenders pressure for new taxes on capital and labor.
Overall, the "new political economy of taxation" may be characterized as an environment where policy makers confront three interrelated constraints: internationalization, domestic economic stress, and budgetary imperatives. Capital mobility has not led-and is not likely to lead-to a "race the bottom" or the evisceration of the revenue-raising capacity of the state: governments can (and do) pursue moderately extensive social protection and public goods provision when they and their electorates so choose. Equally clearly, governments face a new set of challenges from internationalization, and these have contributed to a paradigm shift in tax policy and to some specific tax reductions. At the same time, domestic economic problems call for reductions in tax burdens on capital and labor; these forces compete with international factors for shares of tax reduction. Yet, domestic budget dynamics, especially the size of public sector debt, significantly limits tax policy change. Overall, policy makers in contemporary democratic polities have faced intensifying pressure to reform tax policy to promote economic efficiency. They have found, however, little room for maneuver. For each designated dependent and causal variable, 13 individual country dummy variable-causal variable interactions are entered one at a time in the focal equations of Table 3 . The tax effects of the causal variable within (and outside of) the country may then be computed. For instance, if the interaction is significant, the tax effect of liberalization of capital controls within country i is equal to B 1 + B 3 from the equation: B 1 (Liberalization) + B 2 (Country Dummy) + B 3 (Liberalization*Country Dummy i ) + B 1-k X, where X is a vector of k additional causal variables as specified in Table 3 models. The tax effect of liberalization outside of the focal country is given by B 1 . In each cell, B 1 , B 2 , and B 3 are reported. If the interaction is insignificant, the variable's impact within the country is not different from the 13-nation estimate.
Appendix
*significant at the .10 level; **significant at the .05 level. NE: coefficients can not be estimated because of the absence of variance in one or both focal variables in a nation. 
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